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AFIT/GLM/ENS/09M-01 
Abstract 
 
To emphasize the importance of sustainment, the DoD Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council addressed sustained Materiel readiness and established a mandatory 
Key Performance Parameter (KPP) for Materiel Availability; it also established 
supporting Key System Attributes (KSAs) for Materiel Reliability and Ownership Cost 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3170.01C, 2007). 
Current guidance requires two numbers: a threshold value and an objective 
value (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3170.01C, 2007).  No 
distinction is made between the approaches in establishing these values for major 
system acquisitions, versus smaller, modification-focused efforts for existing systems.    
The Joint Staff proposed guidance to assist in determining these values for major 
acquisition programs, but the guidance has yet to be tested on modification contracts.  
To assess its applicability, we performed a case study of a recent acquisition program 
under consideration by Air Mobility Command.  We sought to apply the principles put 
forth in this draft guide prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 
Collaboration with the Joint Staff. 
This research seeks to assist the combat developer and program manager to  
develop an objective, standard, repeatable method for quantifying the mandatory 
Materiel Availability KPP and the associated Materiel Reliability KSA values 
established by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.    
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QUANTIFICATION OF MANDATORY SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS 
 
I. Introduction 
Background 
 The May 2003 version of DoD Directive (DoDD) 5000.1, “The Defense Acquisition 
System,” references program objectives for total life-cycle systems management, to include 
sustainment (DoDD 5000.1, 2003).  To emphasize the importance of sustainment, the DoD Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council addressed sustained Materiel readiness and established a 
mandatory Key Performance Parameter (KPP) for Materiel Availability; it also established 
supporting Key System Attributes (KSAs) for Materiel Reliability and Ownership Cost 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3170.01C, 2007).  KPPs are those 
system attributes considered most critical or essential for an effective military capability.  KSAs 
are those system attributes considered most critical or essential for an effective military 
capability but not selected as a KPP.  KSAs provide decision makers with an additional level of 
capability prioritization below the KPP but with senior sponsor leadership control (generally 4-
star level, Defense agency commander, or Principal Staff Assistant) (Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3170.01C, 2007).  The values used to describe each KPP and 
KSA are defined by a threshold value and an objective value.  The threshold value for an 
attribute is the minimum acceptable value considered achievable within the available cost, 
schedule, and technology at low-to-moderate risk. Performance below the threshold value is not 
operationally effective or suitable.  The objective value for an attribute is the desired operational 
goal achievable but at higher risk in cost, schedule, and technology. Performance above the 
objective does not justify additional expense. 
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Current guidance requires both threshold and objective value (Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3170.01C, 2007).  No distinction is made between the 
approaches in establishing these values for major system acquisitions, versus smaller, 
modification-focused efforts for existing systems.  In some cases a range of stated values may 
be appropriate, but in other cases the best approach may be to specify the value as a percentage 
change or as a function of other variables.  The Joint Staff proposed guidance to assist in 
determining these values for major acquisition programs, but the guidance has yet to be tested 
on modification contracts.  To assess its applicability, we performed a case study of a recent 
acquisition program under consideration by Air Mobility Command.  We sought to apply the 
principles put forth in this draft guide prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 
Collaboration with the Joint Staff.   
Problem Statement 
 Air Mobility Command (AMC) lacks a standardized method to establish these 
mandatory threshold and objective values for the Materiel Availability KPP and Materiel 
Reliability KSA for modifications to existing weapons systems.  A draft guide is proposed by 
the Joint Staff with the purpose of assisting program decision makers, but its applicability to the 
AMC problem is unclear. 
Research Objective/Questions 
In order to address this issue the following research question was investigated: 
 Research Question:  Is the draft Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Cost 
Guide (RAM-C) that the Office of the Secretary of Defense in Collaboration with the Joint 
Staff prepared applicable for use on modification program?    
 To answer this research question we established five investigative questions: 
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Question 1:  What portions of the guide are applicable to this study and what portions 
do not apply?  Initial review of the RAM-C guide appeared to provide the rationale behind the 
development of the sustainment requirements for new weapon systems.  This research sought to 
determine whether all or portions of this document would be useful in developing sustainment 
requirements for modifications of existing weapon systems.  We evaluated this document in a 
comparative manner to determine program requirement differences. 
Question 2:  What modification program would be a viable candidate for the use in this 
study?  Some of the decision criteria we examined were modification size, timing and current 
acquisition phase.  Another area of interest we considered would be the type of support and 
sustainment contract, whether it is a Performance Based Logistics (PBL) contract or a 
traditional government sustainment contract. 
Question 3:  If the guide is deemed applicable for use in modification or upgrade 
programs what areas within the guide requires changes and what changes are 
recommended? 
  Question 4:  How should historical reliability and maintenance data information 
systems be utilized to establish availability and reliability estimates?  We attempted to 
determine the feasibility of current Air Force data collection systems such as Reliability and 
Maintainability Information System (REMIS), the Supply Management Analysis Reporting 
Tool (SMART), and Global Combat Support System (GCSS) as viable candidates for data 
analysis and model creations. 
Question 5:  Does the current body of literature concerning Performance Based 
Logistics support our efforts to establish sustainment performance parameters? 
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Research Focus   
The Air Force Air Mobility Command’s Directorate of Plans and Programs approached 
us with a request for help in quantifying their KPPs for several ongoing major aircraft 
modifications, and will support our research.  Therefore, we initially focused our research on 
recommending a standardized method for quantifying Materiel readiness sustainment metrics 
for Air Force Air Mobility Command’s modification efforts but we designed our approach and 
methods to be applicable to all major system modifications and upgrades.   
Methodology 
To achieve this objective, we used an ongoing AMC major aircraft modification as a case 
study.  We also engaged in bi-lateral discussions with program and subject matter experts, and 
conducted a review of applicable literature to develop a model that incorporates multiple 
factors impacting each sustainment metrics.  This model was based on the concepts and 
principles put forth in the draft guide developed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 
Collaboration with the Joint Staff. 
The important purpose of sustainment metrics was to ensure that system performance and 
program cost were properly balanced leading to the Materiel capability developed being 
operationally effective, suitable, and affordable for the warfighter.  We utilized input from the 
program office, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, industry, and subject matter expert to 
assist in performing sensitivity analysis on the contributing factors that affected overall system 
readiness levels and effectiveness.  These factors included but were not limited to reliability, 
maintainability, supportability and ownership cost analysis.  By evaluating the effects of trade-
offs performed on these factors we attempted to develop a repeatable solution for the readiness 
requirements mandated by the DoD Joint Requirements Oversight Council.      
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Assumptions and Limitations 
Multiple reliability and maintainability metrics may be applicable to a given program. 
For simplicity, this discussion used the metrics applicable to the Air Force Air Mobility 
Command.  The combat developer, with technical support from the program manager 
(especially in the evaluation of existing technological capabilities), evaluated the achievability 
of the minimum Materiel reliability (reliability required by analyzing the ability of mature or 
developing technologies to provide needed capabilities).  This analysis included historical 
trending for predecessor systems and extrapolation of trending results to applicable new 
replacement technologies (Maintenance Division Joint Staff Logistics Directorate 
(JS/J4/MXD), 2008).  The accuracy of the values set forth in this research depended largely on 
the completeness and accuracy of the data information system used in this research. 
The requirements development process concludes when all inputs are translated into 
Materiel Availability, Materiel Reliability, and Ownership Cost (OC) with supporting rationale 
(Maintenance Division Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (JS/J4/MXD), 2008).  For the purposes 
of this research we only focused on the Materiel Availability KPP and Materiel Reliability 
KSA.  We did not address costs during this study.   It is reasonable to argue that the values 
achieved within this research do not necessarily hold the most optimal values possible.  
Optimization requires an exploration of all three of these factors in combination.  Also, because 
the processes and procedures in this study were focused directly towards modifications, the 
results achieved in this study may not be applicable to new weapon systems acquisitions.   
Implications 
The purpose of this research is to help develop a better understanding of the processes 
involved in developing reasonable and balanced requirements.  In achieving this we hope to 
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increase the ability of the Combat Developer and Program Manager to identify realistic 
threshold and objective values for Materiel readiness sustainment.  This research seeks to assist 
the combat developer and program manager develop an objective, standard, repeatable method 
for quantifying the mandatory Materiel Availability KPP and the associated Materiel 
Reliability KSA values established by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  This will 
help improve management oversight and lead to more cost-effective acquisition programs.   
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II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
 Sustainment concerns regarding acquisition programs are not new.  As early as 1971, 
DoDD 5000.1 stated that “logistics support shall be considered as a principal design parameter” 
in acquisition programs (DoDD 5000.1, 1971).  The 1982 version of the directive specifically 
referenced the concept of sustainability when stating, “improved readiness and sustainability 
are primary objectives of the acquisition process (DoDD 5000.1, 1982).”  In 1996, this same 
philosophy was stated as, “acquisition programs shall be managed to optimize total systems 
performance and minimize the cost of ownership (DoDD 5000.1, 1996).”  the total systems 
approach is addressed in the current version of the directive and states that “the PM shall be the 
single point of accountability for accomplishing program objectives for total life-cycle systems 
management, including sustainment.”  Furthermore, key defense documents (e.g., National 
Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Review) stress life-cycle issues as well (i.e., reduced 
footprint, reduced cycle times, reduced ownership costs).  Thus, the focus of DoD acquisition 
strategies has evolved from an initial reliance on detailed military specifications and 
performance specifications and to a life-cycle systems view.  The Sustainment KPP approach is 
the next iteration in this evolution and refines the process even further. 
A technical report sponsored by the Boeing Aerospace Company entitled 
“Maintainability/Reliability Impact on System Support Costs”, (Johnson et al, 1973), 
highlighted the increasing emphasis placed on the reduction of total life cycle cost on both new 
and existing systems.  In this report data derived from specific equipment/system programs (F-
111, F-4, and A-7D) showed that design efforts to increase reliability and reduce maintenance 
requirements per failure can significantly reduce equipment/system life cycle costs.  Therefore, 
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they offer a major opportunity for support cost savings, especially on equipment that is mission 
essential.  Consequently, improved engineering design analysis techniques, insight, and cost 
consciousness are needed (Johnson et al, 1973).  This report provided a methodology for 
estimating life cycle cost, primarily during the operational phase and addressed quantifiable 
savings that could be determined during early design.   
In another technical report entitled “Category II FB-111A Reliability and Maintainability 
Evaluation”, (Chamblee et al, 1972) results were presented from the Category II test program.  
The aircraft demonstrated a dismal 1.6-hour mean time between failures and a 1.5-hour mean 
time between aircrew write-ups.  The overall aircraft reliability was significantly degraded by 
the low reliability of flight controls and most avionics subsystems.  The contractor predicted 
that 23.8 maintenance man-hours per flying hour would be required, and 48.0 man-hours were 
actually measured.  The results from the performance of the F-111 series of aircraft 
demonstrated how important the factors of reliability and maintainability analysis early-on in 
the acquisition of weapons systems can impact total life cycle cost.   
In a memorandum dated August 16, 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
directed measuring performance in terms of Operational Availability, Mission Reliability, Cost 
per Unit of Usage, Logistics Footprint, and Logistics Response time.  For consistency, this 
memorandum provided specific definitions of those metrics for use across the Department.  
Current guidance directs their use as the standard set of metrics for evaluating overall Total 
Life Cycle Systems Management (TLCSM) Metrics (Under Secretary of Defense, 2005). 
In a memorandum (Under Secretary of Defense, 2005) to the Secretaries of the 
Military Departments, recommendations from the Defense Business Board were presented to 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense that the Departments aggressively pursue implementation of 
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Performance-Based Logistics, for all its weapons, new and legacy (Under Secretary of Defense, 
2005).  This is relevant because PBL concepts stress reliability, maintainability and 
supportability as the drivers of operational effectiveness of a system and play a crucial role in 
procurement decision making (Kumar, 2007). 
In an interview with "Government Executive" magazine May, 2006 Chief of Naval 
Operations, Admiral Michael G. Mullen stated “We have a tendency to look at what it takes to 
get a program out the door.  We don't think too much about what the life cycle [cost] is.  It's 'Can 
I build it?'  I would like us all to be mindful of what it costs to operate whatever we are building 
for whatever its life is going to be because I have to pay that bill every single year” (Chief of 
Naval Operations, Admiral Mullen, 2006). 
 The specific genesis for the current sustainment focus is the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council (JROC) Memorandum 161-06 entitled “Key Performance Parameter Study 
Recommendations and Implementation,” dated 17 August 2006.  Through this memo, the 
JROC established a mandatory warfighter Materiel Availability Key Performance Parameter 
and identified Materiel Reliability and Ownership Cost as related Key System Attributes for 
new acquisitions (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3170.01C, 2007).  
The following four life cycle sustainment outcome metrics were subsequently established by 
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness (DUSD 
(L&MR)):  Materiel Availability, Materiel Reliability, Ownership Cost, and Mean Downtime.  
Furthermore, CJCSM 3170.01C, “Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System,” was modified and reissued on 1 May 2007 to include these sustainment 
metrics. 
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Metrics  
Key Performance Parameters are those system attributes considered most critical or 
essential for an effective military capability.  The Capabilities Development Document (CDD) 
and the Capabilities Production Document (CPD) must contain sufficient KPPs to capture the 
minimum operational effectiveness, suitability, and sustainment attributes needed to achieve 
the overall desired capabilities for the system (or systems if the CDD/CPD describes an system 
of systems) during the applicable increment.  Failure to meet a CDD or CPD KPP threshold 
may result in a re-evaluation or reassessment of the program or a modification of the 
production increments (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3170.01C, 
2007). 
Key System Attributes are those system attributes considered most critical or essential 
for an effective military capability but not selected as a KPP.  KSAs provide decision makers 
with an additional level of capability prioritization below the KPP but with senior sponsor 
leadership control (generally 4-star level, Defense agency commander, or Principal Staff 
Assistant).  In the case of the mandated Sustainment KPP (Materiel Availability), the 
supporting Materiel Reliability and Ownership Cost KSAs require any changes to be 
documented in the subsequent update to the acquisition program baseline (Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3170.01C, 2007). 
Materiel Availability 
Materiel Availability is a measure of the percentage of the total inventory of a system 
operationally capable (ready for tasking) of performing an assigned mission at a given time, 
based on Materiel condition.  This can be expressed mathematically as a proportion of the 
number of operational end items to the total population of end items.  Materiel Availability 
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indicates the percentage of time that a system is operationally capable of performing an 
assigned mission and can also be expressed as the proportion of uptime (operational time) to 
total time (uptime + downtime). Determining the optimum value for Materiel Availability 
requires a comprehensive analysis of the system and its planned use, including the planned 
operating environment, operating tempo, reliability alternatives, maintenance approaches, and 
supply chain solutions.  Materiel Availability is primarily determined by system downtime, 
both planned and unplanned, requiring the early examination and determination of critical 
factors such as the total number of end items to be fielded and the major categories and drivers 
of system downtime.  The Materiel Availability KPP must address the total population of end 
items planned for operational use, including those temporarily in a non-operational status once 
placed into service (such as for depot-level maintenance).  The total life-cycle timeframe, from 
placement into operational service through the planned end of service life, must be included 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3170.01C, 2007). 
Materiel Availability is a number between 0 and 100 that provides the average 
percentage of time that the entire population of systems is materially capable for operational 
use during a specified period.  Operational means in a Materiel condition such that the end item 
is capable of performing an identified mission.  Materiel Availability measures the percentage 
of the entire population that is operational (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 
(CJCSM) 3170.01C, 2007). 
Materiel Reliability 
Materiel Reliability is a measure of the probability that the system will perform without 
failure over a specific interval.  Reliability must be sufficient to support the warfighting 
capability requirements.  Materiel Reliability is generally expressed in terms of a mean time 
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between failures (MTBF), and once operational can be measured by dividing actual operating 
hours by the number of failures experienced during a specific interval.  Reliability may initially 
be expressed as a desired failure-free interval that can be converted to MTBF for use as a KSA 
(e.g., 95 percent probability of completing a 12-hour mission free from mission-degrading 
failure; 90 percent probability of completing 5 sorties without failure).  Specific criteria for 
defining operating hours and failure criteria must be provided together with the KSA. Single-
shot systems and systems for which other units of measure are appropriate must provide 
supporting analysis and rationale (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 
3170.01C, 2007). 
Materiel Reliability = Mean Time Between Failure 
Total Operating HoursMateriel Reliability = 
Total Number of Failures
 
Mean Down Time 
Mean Downtime (MDT) is the average total downtime required to restore an asset to its 
full operational capabilities.  MDT includes the time from reporting of an asset being down to 
the asset being given back to operations/production to operate.  MDT includes administrative 
time of reporting, logistics and materials procurement and lock-out/tag-out of equipment, etc. 
or repair or preventive maintenance (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 
3170.01C, 2007). 
 Total Down Time for All FailuresMean Down Time (MDT) = 
Total Number of Failures
 
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Cost Guide (RAM-C) 
The current guidance regarding life cycle sustainment is relatively new.  Although 
policy has been established, there is very little guidance published to help program managers 
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develop and quantify particular threshold and objective values for the relevant metrics 
discussed above.  The only document is the RAM-C guide (Maintenance Division Joint Staff 
Logistics Directorate (JS/J4/MXD), 2008).  The associated guidance notes that determining the 
optimum value for Materiel Availability requires a comprehensive analysis of the system and 
its planned use.   The guide provides a series of questions to consider for each metric.  
Furthermore, discussions with Air Force headquarters planners suggest that current methods for 
developing particular threshold and objective values for the Materiel availability KPP are ad-
hoc, at best.  The particular relationship between the Materiel Availability KPP and the 
Materiel Reliability & Ownership Cost KSAs isn’t clear.  Finally, it is often questionable 
whether the values used for these measures by headquarters planners are contractually 
enforceable or even measureable.  Therefore, holistic consideration of these metrics provides 
the trade-space to optimize their achievement and provide a balanced solution.  It also enhances 
the end-to-end Materiel readiness value chain perspective being promoted throughout the DoD.   
Performance Based Logistics 
While the research literature on KPP constructs appears to be nonexistent, significant 
research has been done in the context of Performance Based Logistics (PBL) support concepts.  
This is relevant because a weapon system’s key performance parameters should possess linkage 
to the metrics used to assess a contractor’s PBL success.  Mahon (2007) states the stakeholder 
team’s job is to develop performance criteria and metrics that are straightforward, measurable, 
achievable, and are tied to requirements provided by the warfighter.  Metrics are typically 
effectiveness driven, such as assured system availability (percent) and assured component 
availability (percent); or efficiency-driven, such as assured number of flying hours, assured 
number of sorties, etc.  Not all metrics will be objective measures.  Some aspects of product 
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support—for example, customer satisfaction may be subjective measures.  The top-level metric 
objectives established by USD (AT&L) include:   
• Operational Availability - percent of time a system is available for a mission or 
the ability to sustain operations tempo.   
• Operational Reliability - measure of a system meeting mission success objective; 
e.g. a sortie, tour, launch, or destination reached (Mahon, 2007).   
• Cost Per Unit Usage - total operating costs divided by the unit of measurement for 
a given system; e.g. flight hour, launch, or miles driven.   
• Logistics Footprint - size or presence of deployed logistics support required to 
deploy, sustain, or move a system.  
Measurable elements include inventory, equipment, personnel, facilities, transportation 
assets, and real estate.  Mahon argues that the Air Force can’t justify PBL savings on the basis of 
cost savings or reduced logistics footprints, because few PBL strategies simultaneously focus on 
availability, reliability, cost, and logistics metrics.  Some focus on availability, or reduced cost, 
or reduced cycle time (Mahon, 2007). 
Kumar (2007) insists that reliability, maintainability and supportability drive the 
operational effectiveness of a system and play a crucial role in procurement decision making. 
Due to the inherent criticality of reliability, maintainability and supportability in the defense 
industry, several procurement strategies have been evolved to influence decision making in the 
design of products, systems, and most recently, system of systems.  PBL strategies focus on 
product support for large-scale, repairable systems such as fighter aircraft and similar weapon 
systems (Kumar, 2007). 
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Performance Based Logistics uses reliability, maintainability and supportability metrics 
to evaluate effectiveness of a product.  For example, measures such as operational availability 
(OA) and total cost of ownership (TCO) are used to evaluate the overall impact of the system 
design.  Apart from OA and TCO, measures such as Total Operation and Maintenance Cost and 
Logistics Footprint are used to evaluate maintainability and supportability of the system 
respectively.  Kumar states that it is commonly perceived that performance based logistics is 
likely to improve product availability, reliability, maintainability and supportability at a lower 
cost through leveraging commercial best practices.  It is reported that in the Iraq and Afghanistan 
engagements the overall availability of the F/A-18E/F, which has components that incorporate 
PBL, has been 85% compared to the older F/A-18C/D which is supported under the traditional 
logistics practices and achieved only 73% availability.  Thus, there is evidence that PBL 
contracts have benefited the customers and has influenced the customers to use PBL contracts 
instead of the traditional logistics practices under which the customer either purchased or leased 
all the resources required to support the system (Kumar, 2007). 
Simultaneous optimization of reliability, maintainability and supportability is a 
challenging task since improving one aspect of the design may deteriorate another aspect. 
Procurement strategies such as PBL, used by defense and public sector organizations, focus on 
achieving high reliability, maintainability and supportability.  Successful PBL contracts require 
suppliers to find the optimal mix of competing resources that will simultaneously achieve 
multiple, performance metrics.  Total cost of ownership, availability, reliability, maintainability 
and supportability are all goals that are considered simultaneously when determining the optimal 
compliment of competing support resources (Kumar, 2007). 
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Many definitions of PBL exist. In the Defense Acquisition University’s 2005 publication 
entitled Performance Based Logistics: A Program Manager’s Product Support Guide, the 
following definition can be found:  
            Performance Based Logistics (PBL) is the purchase of support as an integrated,  
affordable, performance package designed to optimize system readiness and meet 
performance goals for a weapons system through long-term support arrangements with 
clear lines of authority and responsibility. Simply put, performance based strategies buy 
outcomes, not products or services. 
  
Berkowitz et al., (2005) developed this comprehensive definition to capture the essence 
of this new strategy:  
An integrated acquisition and sustainment strategy for enhancing weapon system 
capability and readiness where the contractual mechanisms will include long-term 
relationships and appropriately structured incentives with service providers, both organic 
and non-organic to support the end user’s (warfighter’s) objective. 
 
As can be seen in both of these definitions, long-term relationships are integral to the 
concept of PBL.  While many different types of business relationships exist, significant long-
term relationships are often referred to as partnerships (Gardner, 2008).  
The goal of both acquisition and sustainment is to gain the most efficient and effective 
performance for a weapon system throughout its life cycle.  In doing so, it is important to realize 
that acquisition and sustainment are not separate but simultaneous and integrative issues that 
require analysis and synthesis throughout the product life cycle (Berkowitz et al., 2005). 
Performance Based Acquisition (PBA) and PBL research is mainly based on systems’ 
performance which is necessary to provide mission capable assets for the warfighters to 
accomplish their mission.  The main purpose of the PBA and PBL is linking the defense 
acquisition and support activities with the warfighters’ needs in the long term agreements with 
the support providers, both organic and non-organic.  Successful PBL implementation provides 
the same level of support within lower costs while diminishing logistics footprints. 
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It can be argued that the DoD’s compelling reasons to partner with its contractors are to 
improve service to its customers, the warfighters, and to improve asset performance and cost 
efficiencies.  By employing the PBL strategy, the DoD aims not only to better meet the needs of 
the operational end-users by improving system performance and readiness (as indicated in the 
aforementioned definitions of PBL), but also to minimize the total system life cycle costs and 
logistics footprints associated with those systems (DoDD 5000.1, 2003).  
Reliability Improvement   
Smith (2004) proposes a process for planning and estimating the cost of a reliability 
improvement program under a PBL construct that accommodates the effect of equipment aging 
and associated reliability degradation.  The process is a structured methodology utilizing past 
field performance information as a basis for predicting future reliability performance. The 
methodology makes use of the predictive results as a basis for estimating the level of effort 
required to satisfy the PBL contract’s reliability and availability goals.  The user will enter into a 
solicitation for a system reliability performance improvement program requesting a desired 
future state that may or may not be based on knowledge of the system’s historical performance. 
The supplier will negotiate with the user the terms of the goal with respect to the cost of 
improving the present demonstrated reliability of the system to the desired goal in terms of 
redesigns and support. The present demonstrated field reliability of the system must be used as a 
baseline and a point of departure in defining the level of effort toward attaining the future goal.  
The user may not be satisfied with the present demonstrated reliability and may demand 
improvement through a Request for Quality Improvement term.  The supplier then must develop 
and present his level of effort estimates for improving the system reliability (Smith, 2004).   
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The 2001 Quadrennial Review (QDR) stated, “DoD will implement PBL to compress the 
supply chain and improve readiness for major weapon systems and commodities.”  Research was 
conducted at AF/A-IL’s request to discover the best practices and lessons learned from the AF’s 
progress in PBL implementation.   There were five objectives of this study:  
1. Provide a common understanding of PBL.  
2. Evaluate AF regulations/guidance to determine they are consistent with the intent 
of existing DoD guidance.  
3. Identify and study PBL implementation “best practices” within the C-17, F-117, 
JSTARS, and selected programs. 
4. Identify and study PBL implementation “lessons learned” within the C-17, F-117, 
JSTARS, and selected programs. 
5. Determine how well the selected programs met the intent of guidance assessed in 
objectives 1 & 2.   
Pettingill and Knipper (2004) and their colleagues found that the F-117, C-17, and 
JSTARS programs being studied are not using high-level performance metrics (e.g., mission 
capability rate, improved product affordability, system reliability, and logistics footprint) that 
measure their success in meeting PBL performance goals (Pettingill, 2004).  
According to the Defense Acquisition University Program Managers Guide, PMs are 
using metrics tied to the systems and subsystems managed by the Product Support Integrator(s) 
under contract, but not to the weapon system as a whole, just as pointed out by Pettingill and 
Knipper.  PBL success meeting lower-level metrics for these programs did not necessarily 
translate to improved weapon system availability, because no direct correlation existed between 
lower- and upper-level metrics.  The PM works with the user/warfighter to establish system 
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performance needs and then works with the product support providers to fulfill those needs 
through documentation of the requirements (including appropriate metrics) in Performance 
Based Agreements (PBAs).  An effective PBL implementation depends on metrics that 
accurately reflect the user’s needs and can be an effective measure of the support provider’s 
performance.  Linking metrics to existing warfighter measures of performance and reporting 
systems is preferable.  Many existing logistics and financial metrics can be related to top-level 
warfighter performance outcomes.  Although actual PBL strategies, as implemented, may 
delineate metrics at levels lower than the warfighter top-level measures (e.g., system 
availability), it is important that the initial identification of performance outcomes be consistent 
with the key top-level metric areas (Defense Acquisition University, 2005).  
Landreth (2005) and his colleagues examined the PBL contract for a naval aircraft 
auxiliary power unit, and reached conclusions similar to those by Mahon and Pettingill et al.  
The contract meets best commercial practices by applying PBL at the component level where 
appropriate system performance data were available to establish cost effective contract 
arrangements.  The contract is not a true PBL application in that the contract buys availability 
and reliability improvements at a fixed price with required improvement schedules. The 
contract does not provide positive incentives for the contractor to provide greater reliability, but 
rather specific reliability improvement deliverables (Landreth, 2005).  Pecht and Thomas 
(2006) illustrate the relationship between warranty and reliability (Pecht, 2006), (Thomas, 
2006).  Thomas and Richard also propose a method to establish reliability goals, or targets for 
creating quality improvement strategies, through reliability improvements of the components 
(Thomas, 2006).   
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Other relevant research includes the work by Kang et al (2005) who presents a suite of 
spreadsheet and discrete-event simulation models that collectively estimate the value of 
system-level responses to improvements in component reliability.  Providing reduced lifecycle 
cost and, at the same time, improving operational availability are fundamental goals of the 
Performance-based Logistics (PBL) and other logistics initiatives of the US Department of 
Defense.  In many PBL contracts, the contractual arrangements are typically stipulated at the 
level of individual components (such as a fuel cell) or a logistic element (such as inventory of 
certain spare parts).  While achieving component-level performance goals is certainly 
important, what really matters to a warfighter is the operational availability of the weapon 
system.  Hence, there is a need to develop a methodology and an apparatus for estimating the 
operational availability (AO
Some research has focused attention on the method of predicting requirements as 
opposed to the metrics themselves.  According to a study to document improving the Materiel 
readiness of the Marine Corps, as requested by the Marine Corps Logistics Command (MCLC) 
Materiel Readiness Integrated Process Team (MRIPT) Lead, reliability, maintainability, and 
availability simulation models provide a time-continuous reconstruction of a weapons system’s 
“average” mission, which involves simultaneous consideration of the system and other events.  
The primary means of evaluating Materiel readiness within the Marine Corps relies on 
deterministic equations.  However, as a system’s complexity increases, so do the number of 
variables necessary to define the system, and the number of associated equations to be solved 
through deterministic methods.  Variables such as in repair, re-supply, partial degradation, duty 
factors, operating factors, allowed downtime events, and all the other complexities of real-life 
) of a weapon system based on the component-level reliability and 
maintainability data (Kang, 2005). 
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system operations or the complete list of the potential Materiel readiness drivers make 
evaluating Materiel drivers circumspect and more difficult to write the probability of success 
formula required by deterministic methods.  Use of a simulation model versus deterministic 
equations would enable these issues to be addressed (Concurrent Technologies Corporation, 
2007). 
Reliability vs Maintainability 
Dellert (2001) examined the impact of reliability and maintainability on the Operations 
and Support (O&S) costs and Operational Availability (AO) of the Comanche helicopter.  The 
research focused on the question of where the Comanche program office should allocate 
resources to minimize O&S costs and maximize AO.  The research indicated that the best 
allocation of resources was to the improvement of system reliability.  The negative impact to 
both O&S costs and AO
For each increment of 10% below predicted levels, up to 40%, the O&S cost increases 
by approximately 3%.  Beyond a level of 40% below the predicted reliability goals, the O&S 
costs will begin to increase at an exponential rate.  In comparison, failure to reach 
maintainability goals only caused a 1% increase in O&S costs for each 10% below predicted 
levels.  This rate of increase remained constant throughout all values of maintainability below 
 was significant if the predicted reliability goals were not met.  The 
primary goal of this research was to determine the sensitivity of O&S costs to variations from 
the predicted reliability and maintainability values.  The biggest concern in this analysis was on 
the impact of not meeting the predicted goals vice the cost savings possible if the goals were 
exceeded.  It was determined that O&S costs were more sensitive to reliability levels below 
predictions than maintainability levels below predictions.   
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predicted.  The impact on O&S costs from reliability values greater than 20% below predicted 
was much more severe than that experienced from similar maintainability levels. 
The greater impact of reliability on O&S costs was attributable to the higher costs 
associated with acquiring repair and replacement parts.  As the reliability decreased the number 
of failures will increase.  This will result in a substantial increase to the total cost for 
consumables items.  Conversely, the actual labor cost makes up a very small amount of the 
total maintenance cost. Since labor performed by military maintenance personnel is covered 
indirectly through their annual salary, the only labor costs are for depot level labor and any 
contract labor that is required.  Hence, decreases in maintainability will have a much smaller 
affect on maintenance costs and O&S costs as a whole.   
Summary 
The key objective of this research seeks to develop an objective, standard, repeatable 
method for quantifying the Materiel Availability KPP and associated Materiel Reliability and 
Ownership Cost KSA values for defense weapon system requirements documents.  We examined 
possible solutions that would provide a launch pad for program managers to utilize in the 
weapon systems acquisition process. 
This chapter examined the genesis behind the mandatory sustainment requirements 
metrics associated with each.  This chapter provided a review of current literature concerning 
Performance Based Logistics support concepts and how these concepts have a direct impact on 
weapons systems sustainment efforts and desired performance parameters.  We also discussed 
some of the literature pertaining to issues such as reliability improvement, maintainability and 
personnel support.  While discernable gaps exists on the development and quantification of 
specific KPP constructs and related KSAs, the information gained through review of this 
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pertinent body of knowledge is very insightful of the linkage that exists between PBL and 
reliability, availability, and maintainability.   
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III. Methodology 
The objective of this research is to recommend a standardized method for quantifying 
Materiel readiness sustainment metrics in military acquisition requirements documents.  To 
achieve this objective, we utilized a case study of a projected aircraft systems modification, 
discussions with subject matter experts, and a review of the literature to develop an appropriate 
decision model that incorporates multiple factors impacting each sustainment metric.  The 
decision model included components of predictive modeling and sensitivity analysis of the 
subsystem components that are incorporated within the projected upgrade to determine the 
overall affect on Materiel readiness values. 
Research Design  
In order to gain an adequate perspective on contract length issues throughout DoD, this 
study included discussions with knowledgeable personnel associated with a variety of 
organizations and programs.  Based on recommendations from the thesis sponsor, Headquarters 
Air Mobility Command, ideas for a currently ongoing acquisition program were solicited for this 
study.  One of the initial points of contention was which modification program would be a 
suitable candidate for this research.  Some of the areas considered for this program were the age 
of the platform.  The platform must be mature enough to provide the needed historical level of 
stability but also has enough existing life span remaining to be cost effective.  This platform also 
needed to be one that was early in its requirements development phase in order to get the 
welcomed support of the program decision makers.    
Headquarters AMC had two major aircraft modifications programs in the early phases 
of acquisition.  Both programs under consideration were based on a traditional in-house 
maintenance and support contract.  First, there is the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-
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Engining Program (RERP).   The C-5 RERP was undertaken to remedy some deficiencies 
identified in the current C-5 fleet and to close the gap requirements for on-time airlift delivery 
of oversize and outsize cargo.  At the heart of RERP acquisition strategy is an Initial 
Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability evaluation of modified C-5B and C-5A aircraft.  
The C-5 RERP will achieve the required wartime 75% MCR by integrating a new commercial-
off-the-shelf (COTS) propulsion system, upgrading 70 subsystems and components (including 
50 reliability enhancements), providing proper spares levels necessary for an 85% issue 
effectiveness rate, and improving the efficiency of C-5 phased inspection and maintenance 
programs.  The C-5M climb performance will ensure access to preferred air traffic routings 
between North America and Europe or Northeast Asia, and provide the capability to operate 
with wartime planning factor loads from shorter runways on hot days.  The C-5M engines will 
meet worldwide aircraft noise and pollution emission standards.  RERP does not change the 
communications, navigation, and surveillance architecture of the C-5 Avionics Modernization 
Program (AMP), and does not communicate with external systems (Capability Production 
Document for C-5 Reliability Enhancement & Re-Engining Program (RERP), 2008).   
The second modification program underway for Headquarters AMC is the 
Communications, Navigation and Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) program.  
The CNS/ATM program is primarily a safety of flight modification.  The CNS/ATM program is 
an acquisition effort to extend the KC-135 as a viable weapon system through fiscal year (FY) 
2040.  It supports mitigating capability gaps identified in the Initial Capabilities Document for 
Air Refueling and the Air Force Integrated-Capability Review and Risk Assessment (I-CRRA), 
anticipated airspace restrictions within the global CNS/ATM System, and overall KC-135 
shortcomings in reliability, maintainability, and supportability.  With current capabilities, the 
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combatant commanders lack sufficient worldwide capable AR assets to accomplish all requested 
future joint operations.  The KC-135 CNS/ATM program includes an integrated digital flight 
director (DFD), radio altimeter (RA), and autopilot (AP) systems and Angle of Attack (AOA) 
(Capability Development Document (CDD) for KC-135 CNS/ATM Program Version 4.4 
ACAT: III, 2008).   
Through careful consideration by Headquarters AMC the KC-135 CNS/ATM program 
was deemed the best fit for this study.  This aircraft system upgrade consists of multiple 
subsystem modifications/component replacement and access to a wide array of historical 
performance and maintenance data would be readily available.  This modification is still in the 
requirements document development phase which makes it a viable platform for study.  Also, 
contact with subject matter experts, program personnel, and industry would be available where 
necessary.  Most importantly, because challenges posed by access to test data on the C-5 RERP 
upgrade components, AMC felt that the KC-135 CNS/ATM program provided a better scale in 
both size and complexity as a starting point.  
Sustainment Requirements 
As defined in the Department of Defense Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and 
Cost Rationale Report Handbook, the mandatory KPP and two supporting KSAs are: 
• Materiel Availability KPP – Measures the percentage of the total inventory of a system 
that is operationally capable (ready for tasking) of performing an assigned mission, at a 
given time, based on Material condition. Materiel Availability also indicates the 
percentage of time that a system is operationally capable of performing an assigned 
mission and can be expressed as the proportion of the number of operational end items to 
the total population of end items. 
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• Materiel Reliability KSA – Measures the probability that the system will perform without 
failure over a specified interval. 
• Ownership Cost KSA – Provides balance to the sustainment solution by ensuring that the 
Operations and Support (O&S) costs associated with Materiel Readiness (eg. 
maintenance, spares, fuel, support, etc.) are considered in making program decisions. The 
Ownership Cost KSA is ultimately based on O&S Cost Estimating Structure elements as 
specified in the OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) “Operating and Support 
Cost-Estimating Guide.” Appropriate sections of this document cover the specific 
elements involved in cost estimation (Maintenance Division Joint Staff Logistics 
Directorate (JS/J4/MXD), 2008). 
Sustainment Requirements Development 
The logical process of developing sustainment requirements has well-defined activities to 
arrive at values that are realistic, achievable, measurable, documented, and therefore defendable. 
The activities are summarized below: 
• The first step in developing sustainment requirements is the preparation of a Draft 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) by the combat developer.  The CONOPS identifies 
the role of the system in providing the capability needed by the warfighter in terms of 
how it will be used operationally (Maintenance Division Joint Staff Logistics 
Directorate (JS/J4/MXD), 2008). 
• Following the development of the CONOPS, the combat developer must articulate the 
mix of ways the system performs its operational role in an Operational Mode Summary 
and Mission Profile (OMS/MP).  This includes the relative frequency of the various 
missions, which systems will be involved in those missions, and the types of 
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environmental conditions the system will be exposed to during the system life.  The 
OMS/MP describes the tasks, events, durations, operating conditions, and environment 
of the system for each phase of a mission (Maintenance Division Joint Staff Logistics 
Directorate (JS/J4/MXD), 2008). 
• Following the development of the CONOPS and OMS/MP the combat developer must 
decide what minimal operational tasks the system must be able to perform in order to 
accomplish its mission and what the associated mission essential functions are in order 
to identify and classify potential failures.  This information is documented in the Failure 
Definition and Scoring Criteria (FD/SC).  The combat developer should receive 
assistance in developing the FD/SC from the program manager including sustainment 
and T&E activities (Maintenance Division Joint Staff Logistics Directorate 
(JS/J4/MXD), 2008). 
• The combat developer uses the OMS/MP and FD/SC to conduct an analysis to 
determine the maintenance and support concepts describing the levels of maintenance 
and the maintenance activities that will be conducted at each level.  All of this 
information is used to draft initial Materiel Availability, Materiel Reliability, and 
Ownership Cost goals and document supporting rationale and assumptions 
(Maintenance Division Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (JS/J4/MXD), 2008). 
• The program manager takes the above information from the combat developer and 
determines what is achievable based on technology maturity and other factors.  The 
combat developer and program manager must enter into a continuous dialogue so that 
appropriate trade studies can be completed, further analysis conducted, and appropriate 
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trade decisions made (Maintenance Division Joint Staff Logistics Directorate 
(JS/J4/MXD), 2008).  
• Once the combat developer and program manager have reached agreement on a 
balanced solution with acceptable trade-offs based on the state of the possible, the 
combat developer needs to identify the appropriate sustainability requirements for 
inclusion in the Capability Development Document (CDD)and Capability Production 
Document (CPD) (Maintenance Division Joint Staff Logistics Directorate 
(JS/J4/MXD), 2008).   
• In the end, the sustainment requirements must enable warfighter functional 
requirements and be measurable and obtainable.  Unrealistic, missing, ambiguous, 
and/or conflicting requirements affect the development process, result in unacceptable 
or unachievable performance levels, and drive acquisition and sustainment costs. All 
requirements must carefully balance technological feasibility with operational needs 
and desires, and are subject to trade-off in order to optimize Materiel Availability 
(Maintenance Division Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (JS/J4/MXD), 2008). 
• The requirements development process concludes when all inputs are translated into 
Materiel Availability, Materiel Reliability, and Ownership Cost (OC) with supporting 
rationale. The resulting lower level requirements, as identified by the combat developer 
and rationale are documented in the CDD and the CPD depending on the program 
phase. The lower level requirements, such as Mean Time To Repair, Administrative 
Delay Time, and Logistics Delay Time, are used in evaluating the resulting Sustainment 
Requirement values (Maintenance Division Joint Staff Logistics Directorate 
(JS/J4/MXD), 2008). 
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For the purposes of this research we will only focus of the Materiel Availability KPP and 
the Materiel Reliability KSA.  With this fact in mind it will be reasonable to argue that the values 
achieved within this research will not necessarily hold the most optimal values possible since a 
the most optimal value requires an exploration of all three of these factors in combination.  We 
will not focus on the development of a CONOPS, OMS/MP, and FD/SC for this system because 
there will be no differentiation in use between the legacy system and the upgraded system.     
Maintenance Concept and Support Plans Consideration 
The maintenance concept is a general description of the maintenance tasks required in 
support of a given system or equipment and the designation of the maintenance level for 
performing each task.  The maintenance concept is implemented through a Product Support 
Plan (Maintenance Division Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (JS/J4/MXD), 2008).   
Product Support is the management/technical activities and resources needed to 
implement the maintenance concept and establish and maintain the readiness and operational 
capability of a weapon system, its subsystems, and its sustainment infrastructure. Product 
Support encompasses Materiel management, distribution, technical data management, 
maintenance, training, cataloging, configuration management, engineering support, repair parts 
management, failure reporting and analyses, and independent logistics assessments.  While the 
provider of the support may be Public, Private, or a Public-Private Partnership, the focus is to 
achieve maximum weapon system availability at the lowest total ownership cost. Product 
Support Plans detail how the sustainment requirements and resources are managed over the life 
cycle (Maintenance Division Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (JS/J4/MXD), 2008).  The 
product support plans for the legacy system will be utilized for the modified platform.  
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Warfighter Capability Needs 
Warfighter needs are the basis for development of Materiel systems. These needs are 
usually framed by the combat developer as a required capability to perform a mission. For 
example, a typical requirement for a system might be that it has a “95-percent chance of 
completing a 12 hour mission with no mission affecting failures.” The program manager 
translates the combat requirements into specific Materiel Availability, Materiel Reliability, and 
Ownership Cost metrics. The resulting metrics must fully define warfighter requirements from 
a contract perspective (Maintenance Division Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (JS/J4/MXD), 
2008). 
Table 1- Metric Definitions 
 
Metric Nomenclature Definition 
A Materiel Availability M Percentage of total systems available for operational use 
A Operational 
Availability 
O Percentage of time a system is available for operational 
use 
R Materiel Reliability M The probability that the system will perform its intended 
function over a specified time period 
MTBF Mean Time Between 
Failures 
The average time between system failures under 
specified conditions 
MTBM Mean Time Between 
Maintenance 
The average time between system maintenance activities 
under specified conditions 
MDT Maintenance Down 
Time 
The average down time for maintenance actions (includes 
MTTR, LDT, and ADT) 
MTTR Mean Time To 
Repair 
The average time required to repair the system after 
failure 
LDT Logistics Delay Time All non-administrative maintenance delays involved in 
repair actions—including transportation of the system to 
the repair location, time required to obtain necessary 
spares, time waiting for repair personnel availability, etc. 
ADT Administrative Delay 
Time 
Times associated with processes not directly involved in 
restoration or repair activities, such as processing of 
requests, short term non-availability of repair facilities, or 
delays due to establishment of higher priorities. 
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One important purpose of the sustainment metrics is to ensure that system performance 
and program cost are properly balanced leading to the Materiel capability developed being 
operationally effective, suitable, and affordable for the warfighter. 
The balanced solution will determine the optimal points for reliability and sustainment 
cycle time early in program development thus ensuring an acceptable life cycle cost for the 
system consistent with needed mission functional performance. 
Supportability and maintainability concepts considered should include system Mean 
Down Time (MDT) optimization and ease of system maintenance. MDT is reduced by limiting 
Logistics Delay Time (LDT) through pre-positioning sufficient spares and an efficient supply 
system ensuring the spares are available at the right place at the right time. Limiting 
Administrative Down Time (ADT) is another way to limit overall system down time. ADT is 
time required to initiate a maintenance action after an issue surfaces. Designing maintainability 
into the system will reduce Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) again reducing MDT (Maintenance 
Division Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (JS/J4/MXD), 2008). 
Materiel Availability 
Materiel Availability (AM) is the sustainment KPP for applicable systems as defined 
previously. AM is a characteristic of the system’s design, support structure, and operational use 
profile. When the system capability is fully fielded, AM
acquired items end ofnumber  total
items end loperationa ofnumber 
=MA
 is defined by the following equation: 
 
 
 
These point estimates are based on the following equivalent definition of AM: 
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Where: 
 
Uptime = Time the system is available to perform designated mission 
Downtime = Total time – Uptime = Time system is unavailable for tasking 
MDT = Total system downtime expected given the anticipated support structure 
The first step in determining Materiel Availability requirements would be to establish 
the baseline availability and reliability of the legacy system to be upgraded.  The baseline 
metric for comparison will be the actual MTBF of the CNS/ATM -replaced systems collected 
over a 12 month period.  Legacy baseline rates can be derived from the Reliability and 
Maintainability Information System (REMIS) to the subsystem level. 
Materiel Reliability 
Materiel Reliability is a characteristic of the final system design and is designated a 
KSA.  Materiel Reliability is defined by the MTBF of the system.  Key to determining the 
MTBF for any system or subsystem is to first determine that system’s failure time distribution. 
For this study the failure time distribution was determined by taking the historical data 
retrieved from a PRP-4126 report in REMIS and utilizing software such as ARENA® or JMP® 
to fit the most applicable distribution.  This report contains data representing actual failure and 
repair historical data used to determine the mean times between failures and mean time to 
repair.  These MTBF and MTTR values will be considered the equilibrium for all distributions 
that are fitted in this research. 
Data Collection and Analysis  
Determining which of the maintenance data reporting and collection systems would be 
appropriate for this study was critical in establishing a baseline metric for analysis.  There were 
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three data sources under consideration for this research.  The Reliability and Maintainability 
Information System (REMIS) is an on-line source of unclassified maintenance and supply data 
for all USAF aircraft.  The maintenance information consists of reliability and maintenance 
factors at the two through five digit Work Unit Code (WUC) level.  REMIS is the primary Air 
Force data system for collecting, validating, editing, processing, integrating, standardizing, and 
reporting equipment maintenance data, including reliability and maintainability data, on a 
global, world-wide basis.  REMIS provides authoritative information on weapon system 
availability, reliability and maintainability, capability, utilization, and configuration.  REMIS 
consists of an integrated database containing weapon system and equipment inventory, 
operational status, configuration management, Time Compliance Technical Order (TCTO) 
data, and reliability and maintainability analysis data (REMIS Program Management Office, 
2008). 
Next, we considered the Global Combat Support System-Air Force (GCSS-AF), an Air 
Force (AF) family of systems (FoS) that is an integral part of GCSS, the Joint Combat Support 
Command and Control FoS.  The GCSS-AF mission is to provide timely, accurate, and trusted 
Agile Combat Support information to Joint and AF commanders, their staffs and ACS 
functional personnel at all ranks and echelons.  In addition, GCSS-AF is the means by which 
ACS Automated Information Systems will be modernized and integrated to improve business 
processes (Frye, 2004). 
The Supply Management Analysis Reporting Tool (SMART) provides users with a 
broad range of AF field and depot supply chain visibility, including demand forecasting, 
aircraft availability, organic and contract (repair and new buy) past delivery, in work and due-
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in, requisition visibility, etc.  SMART includes 120 plus analyses, designed to provide supply 
chain personnel needed visibility to answers most questions (Knight, 2008). 
Discussions with the Logistics Branch Requirements Division, Headquarters Air 
Mobility Command and the 135th Aircraft Availability Improvement Program Analysis, 
Logistics Integration Flight, 550th Aircraft Sustainment Squadron, 827th
Legacy System Baseline Establishment 
 Aircraft Sustainment 
Group were undertaken to utilize the wealth of data analysis and program experience that exists 
among personnel with an extensive working knowledge of the KC-135 aircraft historical 
performance data.  Through these discussions we determined that REMIS would be the best 
source for the historical data needed in this research.  REMIS tools for more tailor configured 
reports and request allowing less navigation of undesirable data.  REMIS also allows for user 
specified report formats such as PDF, Excel, and Delimited Text.  This provides for ease of 
data analysis and reporting of output.  The REMIS Program Management Office is located at 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio allowing for face to face consultation when necessary.   
Having direct access to the REMIS system management personnel and close proximity to an 
operational KC-135 unit that utilizes REMIS as to satisfy its analytical needs was extremely 
helpful considering the limited amount of time available to learn a complex data collection 
system.  Information pertaining to the reasonable and achievable performance of COTS 
equipment was obtained from industry through Headquarters Air Mobility Command.   
The following steps illustrate how the draft guide is used to establish the baseline 
performance measures. 
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Step 1: Determine the baseline reliability measure 
A working relationship was established with the 121st Air Refueling Wing (ARW) for 
the purpose of determining the best tools and reports embedded within REMIS that would 
benefit this research.  The 121st ARW is an Air National Guard unit based near Columbus, 
Ohio.  They were contacted to assist with this research because of the close proximity of their 
location to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.  Also, the National Guard represents a 
population that brings a different experience level and stability that is not normally present in 
most active duty units due to normal change in permanent duty cycles and movement to 
different weapons systems.  For this purpose, the 121st was chosen as one of two KC-135 
aircraft operations unit in this study.  The 100th
REMIS is accessed via the Air Force portal.  Authorization to REMIS is limited to U.S. 
government use only and performance of official duties is a requirement for access.  An 
 Air Refueling Wing based out of RAF 
Mildenhall Air Base, England was chosen as the second unit for study in this research because 
it represents an active duty component and an overseas unit.  An overseas unit was chosen 
because it presents a different variable in possible LDT than was would be present in a stateside 
organization.   
The MTBF totals were determined by extracting historical maintenance data from 
REMIS.  This data encompassed actual failure and repair history of 40 aircraft over a 12-month 
time period.  The 12-month time span in this study is due to a limitation within the REMIS 
system that only allows for only a 12-month look-back from time of request in the PRP -4126 
On/Off Equipment Maintenance Detail Reports.  The PRP-4126 On/Off Equipment 
Maintenance Detail Report contains chronological failure and maintenance data for weapons 
systems that are in the U. S. Air Force inventory.   
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evaluation of reliability and availability of these aircraft was done with respect to possessed 
flight hours during this operational range.  Utilizing statistical tools available in ARENA® and 
JMP® software and basic statistics embedded in Microsoft Excel®, the baseline aircraft 
reliability measures stated as MTBF hours can be established for the entire aircraft system 
minus the subsystem to be upgraded.  The same process can be utilized to determine the MTBF 
for each upgrade system.  This allows for the evaluation of the aircraft as a complete system 
and allows for segregation of upgrade systems for later sensitivity analysis. 
Once the decision was made about which reports would be appropriate for this study 
retrieval of the data was the next step.  Through coordination with the REMIS office at Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio it was determined that for ease of use, the data would be 
downloaded directly into Excel® spreadsheets for statistical analysis and charting, and further 
analysis in ARENA®.  Figure 1 represents a sample of the critical data used in this study.  One 
of the main requirements in determining time between successive failures is the operating time 
of the equipment being evaluated.  With the aid of the REMIS office and the Analysis Branch 
of the 121st ARW it was immediately evident that a key field in the PRP-4126 was not 
reported.  This field should have contained current operating time reported in flight hours for 
each work unit code failure.  After discussions with the REMIS office, we determined that this 
was a known anomaly within the REMIS system that would require at minimum 12 months of 
software rewrite to correct. 
 
 
Figure 1- PRP-4126 On/Off Equipment Maintenance Detail Report 
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Further engagement with the 121st ARW and Headquarters Air Mobility Command led 
to a solution that was determined to be feasible and a reasonable work-around.  This work-
around involved the basic assumption that as a failure occurred and post-flight write-ups were 
entered, maintenance actions proceeded immediately.  First, we noted that a start maintenance 
action time is recorded when a maintenance crew begins work to correct a write-up and a stop 
time is recorded when all work has complete that results in a return to operational available 
status.  After sorting all data by aircraft serial number, start date, and then start time, the time 
between successive failures for each subsystem was determined using the stop time of the 
previous failure to the start time of the next failure.  A twenty four hour clock was used to 
determine this time between failures.  The assumption was that these aircraft would be 
available for operational use during times between failures.  Data received from Headquarters 
Air Mobility Command in coordination with industry was utilized to validate the measures 
obtained from this work-around.  We determined that this method provided a level of accuracy 
that was consistent with the numbers that were provided by Headquarters Air Mobility 
Command.   
All subsystems identified for modification in KC-135 CNS/ATM program are required 
for flight in-accordance with the Minimum Essential Systems List (MESL) for MDS KC135 as 
of December 01, 2008.  A critical failure reported on any one of these system causing that 
system to be non-mission capable causes a non-mission capable status for the aircraft system as 
a whole.  Also, independence between the subsystems is exists.  That is a failure in one 
subsystem has no impact on another subsystem.  The series relationship between the Digital 
Flight Director (DFD), Radio Altimeter (RA), Auto Pilot (AP), and Angle of Attack (AOA) is 
represented by the reliability block diagram in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2– Subsystem Reliability Block Diagram 
 
Step 2:  Associate average times to repair 
The maintainability metrics will be determined in the same manner as the MTBF.  
These metrics will include MTTR, ADT, and LDT.  Where ADT and LDT historical measures 
are not specified as a segregated value in REMIS, they are incorporated in the repair time; 
hence, MTTR times are MDT. 
The Headquarters AMC has required that the KC-135 CNS/ATM system shall not 
shorten the interval for scheduled depot maintenance for the aircraft.  Also, The KC-135 
CNS/ATM system shall not increase the KC-135 scheduled maintenance downtime.  Since 
upgrade requirements pose no impact to system overhaul interval scheduled and scheduled 
maintenance downtime, it will not be required to determine sustainment requirements for this 
upgrade program. 
ADT measures the administrative delays in initiating maintenance. Examples of ADT 
related delays are those required to initiate a request for repair, process paperwork related to the 
repair, or approve the repair. LDT measures logistics delays related to repairs. Examples of 
LDT delays are delays in spares availability, maintenance personnel shortages, transportation 
delays (to/from maintenance locations), etc (Maintenance Division Joint Staff Logistics 
Directorate (JS/J4/MXD), 2008). 
Step 3:  Calculate the resulting Baseline Materiel Availability 
(downtime)(uptime)
(uptime)
+
=MA  = )(
)(
MDTMTBF
MTBF
+  
 
DFD 
 
RA 
 
AP 
 
AOA 
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r MTBF MDTλ
= =
+ +
 
 
where r = MTTR, and λ = MTBF 
Step 4:  Determine Spares Requirement 
Spares may include the number of spare systems as well as the number of removable 
components and parts spares.  Establishing adequate spares support can have as much impact 
on system availability as the inherent reliability and maintainability.   
Sensitivity Analysis 
In addition to recommendations brought forth by the draft guide, sensitivity analysis 
was performed on the recommended values established by industry to ensure first, that the 
values represent achievable measures.  Also, through sensitivity analysis, program officials can 
see the impact that some variables established from historical performance achievements may 
have on reliability and availability.  This evaluation provides the trade space in which decisions 
can be made about optimal reliability improvement measures versus costs.   
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IV. Data Analysis 
The data retrieved from REMIS represents actual failure and repair history for the two 
units of study over a 12 month flying period.  This data was analyzed utilizing the ARENA 
Input Analyzer “fit all” tool to determine the MTBFs for each legacy subsystem that is to be 
upgraded in addition to the rest of the systems that make of the aircraft minus the four upgrade 
systems.  For the DFD, RA, AP, and AOA subsystems, while the p-values reject the null 
hypothesis that the data sampled is that of a Weibull distribution, information presented by 
Banks et al (2005) suggest that a large sample size, such as those present in this study may 
causes a rejection of all candidate distributions.   Because of this the associated histograms in 
appendix 3 were utilized to present evidence that the Weibull distribution does provide an 
appropriate fit.  The same holds true for the remaining aircraft systems minus the upgrade 
systems.  This data is of an Exponential distribution.  The MTBF values and failure 
distributions are shown in Table 2.   
Determine Baseline Reliability and Availability   
Table 2– Failure Time Distribution Data 
Subsystem Distribution MTBF 
(Flt Hrs) 
Kolmogorov 
Smirnov 
p-value 
Sample 
Size 
Aircraft Exponential 12 < 0.01 5082 
DFD Weibull 717 < 0.01 154 
RA Weibull 370 < 0.01 134 
AP Weibull 417 < 0.01 352 
AOA Weibull 398 < 0.1 49 
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Except for the AOA subsystem, we used histograms to determine the appropriate repair 
time distributions.  The MTTR for each subsystem is represented by the data in Table 3.  The 
associated histograms are shown in Appendix 4. 
Table 3– Repair Time Distribution Data 
Subsystem Distribution MTTR 
(Hours) 
Kolmogorov 
Smirnov 
p-value 
Sample 
Size 
Aircraft Beta 1.08 < 0.01 5083 
DFD Lognormal 1.83 < 0.01 155 
RA Lognormal 1.56 < 0.01 135 
AP Beta 1.93 < 0.01 353 
AOA Exponential 2.28 > 0.15 50 
 
 
The next step in determining the system baseline availability is to calculate the MTBF 
for the system.   
In general, for the fitted failure rate values obtained from Input Analyzer in ARENA® 
 1
1/
System n
i
i
MTBF
MTBF
=
∑
 
where MTBFi
1 1 1 1 11/ [( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] 10.83
12 717 370 417 398System
MTBF = + + + + =
 = mean time to failure of the ith component/subsystem. 
The system MTBF is therefore given by: 
 Hours (4.1) 
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The system MTBF for just the subsystems that are to be upgraded would be 
extrapolated and calculated using the same method.  The subsystems to be upgraded system 
MTBF value was determined to be: 
 1 1 1 11/ [( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] 111.01 hours
717 370 417 398Upgrade System
MTBF − = + + + =
 (4.2)
 
Next, determine the system MTTR.  This is accomplished as follows: 
 1 1 1 1 1[( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] 3 . 0 7
1.08 1.83 1.56 1.93 2.28System
MTTR = + + + + = Hours (4.3) 
Resulting Materiel Availability: 
(downtime)(uptime)
(uptime)
+
=MA  = )(
)(
MDTMTBF
MTBF
+
 
 M
r MTBFA
r MTBF MDTλ
= =
+ +
 
where r = 1/MTTRSystem and λ = 1/MTBFSystem
.3257 .7791
.3257 .0923M
A = =
+
. 
The Baseline Materiel Availability for the 12 month historical data is therefore: 
 
 (4.4)
 
To ensure the validity of this process, performance measures output by the 135th 
Aircraft Availability Improvement Program Analysis, Logistics Integration Flight, 550th 
Aircraft Sustainment Squadron, 827th Aircraft Sustainment Group were cross-referenced.  The 
values they reported for the specific time period of this research was an approximate match to 
our measures.   
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Resulting Minimum Number of Spares Required 
Assuming instantaneous replacement of failed subsystem component with spares and 
that all failed subsystem components are repairable (in order to simplify the example), the 
minimum number of spares required can be determined by: 
 
40 0.7791M
arcftA percentage of aircraft operational
X
= = =
 (4.5)
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Solving for X:             
 
40 52
0.7791
arcftX after rounding up = =    
 
Number of spares = 52 - 40.  To keep 40 aircraft operational on average for 1 year, 12 
spares are required. 
Reliability Sensitivity Analysis 
The first step was to evaluate the sensitivity of the model to changes in multiple 
variables that play a factor in overall reliability and availability.  For this research we only 
evaluated the effect of changing one variable at a time, not focusing on interactions between 
variables.  A key variable to consider when determining how changes to individual and system 
reliability may be affected, would be to perform sensitivity analysis on the individual 
subsystem scale parameters (θ).  This will enable the developer to determine what impact that 
different characteristic life values will have on the reliability of the subsystem/components and 
the system reliability.  Each of the subsystems to be upgraded in this study was determined to 
have a Weibull failure distribution.  We performed this evaluation using the shape parameters 
(β) established from failure data obtained in the baseline measures.   
We began by establishing values based on the recommended objective values provided 
by industry’s COTS measures.   This would enable us to determine the probability of meeting 
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these objective measures.  Table 4 shows industry recommended threshold and objective 
values.   
Table 4– Industry Threshold and Objective Values 
 THRESHOLD OBJECTIVE Beta 
DFD 1545 hrs 2705 hrs 43.4 
RA 773 hrs 1352 hrs 14.3 
AP 657 hrs 966 hrs 35.3 
AOA 927 hrs  1159 hrs 6.69 
 
We began our analysis by using a value that is 1 percent higher than industry’s 
recommended objective value and increased that measure incrementally by 1 percent through 
95 percent above that recommended objective value to determine the influence that it has on 
system reliability.  Except for the AOA threshold, all values at 1 percent and above objective 
have at least a 100 percent probability of meeting threshold levels so we will only evaluate 
achieving the objective values.  As shown in the calculations below the one percent above 
objective value achieves an 81 percent probability of meeting the AOA threshold value. 
 ( )tR e βθ= −  
where t = MTBFThreshold and θ = one percent above MTBFObjective
6.69927( ) .81111171AOAR e= − =
. 
  
where t = MTBFObjective and θ = one percent above MTBFObjective
43.22705( ) .52142732DFDR e= − =
. 
  
One percent incremental increases above recommended objective values for each 
subsystem are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5– Subsystem Reliability at Different percentages Above MTBF Objective Values 
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% Above .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08 
DFD .5214 .6544 .7574 .8329 .8862 .9230 .9481 .9650 
RA .4218 .4706 .5208 .5649 .6091 .6472 .6847 .7166 
AP .4990 .6048 .7033 .7809 .8348 .8801 .9134 .9355 
AOA .3932 .4161 .4406 .4627 .4861 .5089 .5292 .5506 
 
Since system reliability is a probability, the system reliability may be determined from 
subsystem/component reliabilities.  Components within a system may be related or configured 
to one another in two primary ways:  in either a serial or a parallel configuration.  In series all 
components must function for the system to function. In a parallel, or redundant, configuration, 
at least one component must function for the system to function.  All components in this system 
are considered critical for operation.  Under this concept a failure in any one component or 
subsystem would render the aircraft inoperable.  All components must be functional for the 
system to be operational.  This series relationship is represented by the reliability block 
diagram of figure 3. 
 
Figure 3- System Reliability Block Diagram 
The Upgrade System Reliability is therefore: 
 
1
n
Upgrade System i
i
R R
=
=∏  
where i = the ith subsystem/component. 
The System Reliability at one percent above the objective value is therefore: 
 .5214 .4218 .4990 .3932 .0432Upgrade SystemR = × × × =  
DFD RA AP AOA 
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Table 6 shows the upgrade system reliability increases at one percents incremental 
increases above the recommended objective values.  
Table 6 – Upgrade System Reliability Increase versus Scale Parameter (Ө) Increase 
Ө Increase .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08 
R .0432 System  .0775 .1222 .1700 .2190 .2676 .3138 .3562 
 
In establishing the system level reliability requirements, both system performance and 
the cost associated with system performance must be considered.  The trade space for the 
sustainment requirements is determined by the threshold and objective values determined for 
Materiel Availability, Materiel Reliability, and Ownership Cost.  Internal trade-offs are made 
to develop the optimal system for the given acquisition/sustainment approach (for example, 
increasing or decreasing the Materiel Reliability values to reduce the overall LCC).  Even 
though cost analysis will not be thoroughly explored during this study, figures 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 
clearly demonstrate the trade space that exists between reliability improvement and 
characteristic life that is associated with reliability improvements.  For this research we are 
only considering the impact of the factors that affect achieving quantifiable and reproducible 
sustainment metrics.     
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Figure 4- DFD Reliability vs Ө Increase 
 
 
Figure 5- RA Reliability vs Ө Increase 
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Figure 6– AP Reliability vs Ө Increase 
 
 
Figure 7– AOA Reliability vs Ө Increase 
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Figure 8– System Reliability vs Ө Increase 
The sensitivity analysis performed demonstrates the ability of the procedures utilized in 
the study to provide decision makers with additional tools that provide visibility of the trade-
offs that may be capitalized upon.  For example, the rate of return on additional investment to 
improve the reliability of the DFD, RA, and AP would provide a much better dollar for dollar 
return than would be realized if additional funds were allocated toward improving the 
reliability of the AOA subsystem.  The concepts in this guide would allow developers to meet 
the warfighters requirements in a realistic manner while simultaneously minimizing costs. 
Materiel Availability Sensitivity Analysis 
Once analyses pertaining to reliability measures were completed, the next sustainment 
measure of interest was availability.  Just as accomplished with the reliability measures, we 
first evaluated the impact that the industry recommended values had on availability.  The 
system threshold and objective MTBF values of 220 hours and 333 hours respectively, were 
evaluated to determine what noticeable impact is recorded from the baseline availability 
measures compare to the values recorded from equation 4.4.  Following this, we evaluated 
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availability at 10 percent incremental increases above the recommended objective value.  The 
impact on overall availability was examined from the 10 percent above the recommended value 
continuing through a 500 percent increase.  
Availability at industry recommended threshold values would be determined by: 
 
   u
*M
System upgrade Subsystem pgrade
r rA
r rλ λ−
=
+ +
 
 
The Threshold Materiel Availability is therefore: 
 .3257 .3257* .7852
.3257 .0833 .3257 .0046M
A = =
+ +  (4.6)
 
where r = 1/MTTRSystem and λSystem – upgrade = 1/MTBFSystem – upgrade (1/12 hours) and  
λSubsystem upgrade = 1/MTBFSubsystem upgrade 
.3257 .3257* .7890
.3257 .0833 .3257 .0030M
A = =
+ +
(1/220 hours).  
   
Availability at industry recommended objective values would be; 
 
 (4.7)
 
where .0030 = 1/333 hours. 
The subsystems to upgraded baseline system MTBF value was established as 111 hours.  
The values of 220 hours and 333 hours represent an increase of 98 percent and 200 percent.  As 
seen from the calculated availability values, the increase in availability for these proposed 
reliability improvements equate to only a small amount.  The impact of the 10 percent 
incremental increases above the recommended objective value is represented in figure 9.     
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Figure 9– Objective Availability vs Upgrade MTBF Increase 
Repair Time Sensitivity Analysis  
Finally, there may be limits to what may be achieved through reliability improvements.  
Another area to consider when examining ways to reduce Life Cycle Costs is to explore the 
maintainability of the system.  This process begins by defining maintainability goals.  The 
determination of these goals coincides with the reliability specifications.  Trade-offs between 
reliability and maintainability can be examined (Ebeling, 2005).  The COTS based component 
replacements considered for this modification contract consist of black box type LRUs that 
require shorter replacement time and provide ease of access.  For this reason, Headquarters 
AMC with the consultation of industry experts have set a goal of a repair time reduction to not 
more than 30 minutes on average for modifications related repairs compared to the historical 
value of 3 hours from equation 4.3.   
Threshold Availability at the 30 minute recommended repair time would be: 
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where 2 = 1/.5 hours. 
Objective Availability at the 30 minute recommended repair time would be: 
 
.3257 2* .7951
.3257 .0833 2 .0030M
A = =
+ +  (4.9)  
As seen from these calculations, maintainability design goals present even further 
availability improvements beyond the reliability improvements of 78.52% and 78.90% 
experienced from calculations presented in equation 4.6 and 4.7.  The visibility of the 
availability gains achieved from this modification program would be valuable for any 
developer tasked with setting readiness requirements that are realistic and achievable. 
Table 7– Aircraft Availability Improvement Values 
 3.07 Hr MTTR 0.5 Hr MTTR 
Baseline Availability .7791 N/A 
Threshold Availability .7852 .7941 
Objective Availability .7890 .7951 
 
Resulting Minimum Number of Spares Require 
 
40 0.7944M
arcftA percentage of aircraft operational
X
= = =
 (4.10)
 
Solving for X: 
40 51
0.7791
arcftX after rounding up = =    
The number of spares = 51 – 40.  To keep 40 aircraft operational on average for 1 year, 
11 spares are required at both threshold and objective availability values. 
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The key purpose for this research was not to show whether these increases would 
provide sizeable gains, or optimize reliability to cost trade-offs, but to develop an objective, 
standard, repeatable method for quantifying the Materiel Availability KPP and the associated 
Materiel Reliability KSA value for defense weapon system requirements documents.    
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V. Recommendations 
Answering the Research Question 
Air Mobility Command (AMC) lacks a standardized method to establish these 
mandatory threshold and objective values for the Materiel Availability KPP and Materiel 
Reliability KSA for modifications to existing weapons systems.  A draft guide is proposed by 
the Joint Staff with the purpose of assisting program decision makers, but it’s applicability to 
the AMC problem is unclear. 
Is the draft Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Cost Guide (RAM-C) that the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense in Collaboration with the Joint Staff prepared applicable 
for use on modification program?   
Yes this draft guide is applicable for modification programs.  We feel that better results 
can be achieved when utilizing this draft guide if recommendations to the 5 investigative 
questions are implemented.   
Investigative Questions 
Question 1:  What portions of the guide are applicable to this study and what portions 
do not apply? 
The primary purpose of this study was to determine if the principles and processes 
contained within a draft RAM-C guide would provide assistance in helping the combat 
developer in establishing reasonable, balanced mandatory sustainment requirements.  The 
concepts and principles were applied to an ongoing major aircraft modification program for 
planners at Headquarters AMC.   
Unlike new weapons systems acquisitions, most modifications are undertaken to 
improve on existing capabilities without changing the basic theory of employment of the 
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upgraded system.  The processes outlining the development of the CONOPS, OMS/MP, and 
FD/SC do not seem applicable to this study mainly because these areas would remain 
unchanged from the legacy system.  Also, the information pertaining to maintenance concepts 
and product support were of little use for this modification, considering the maintenance and 
support framework would be unchanged from the legacy system.   
The concepts in this document that was most useful was the information pertaining to 
the calculation of the baseline reliability and availability metrics.  Also the spares requirements 
calculation was very helpful and insightful.    
Question 2:  What modification program would be a viable candidate for the use in 
this study? 
For this study we considered two in-progress aircraft modification programs for 
Headquarters AMC, the C- 5 RERP and the KC-135 CNS/ATM.  Both programs were 
modifications to aircraft that have been in the Air Force inventory for decades.  This provided 
us access to a wealth knowledge and historical trend data that is required to assess what 
information that is pertinent in establishing sustainment requirements.    
In choosing our aircraft for this study we examined issues such as size of modification, 
accessibility to performance data and phase of contract acquisition.  Each program presented a 
different level of complexity based on the number of subsystems to be upgraded.  Both 
programs involved some form of COTS systems components and access to industry’s estimated 
performance data was available.  The main deciding factor between the two modification 
programs was the size of the system upgrade.  For this reason the KC-135 CNS/ATM program 
was chosen as the program for study.  But overall, based on the results achieved from this 
research, it is highly conceivable that a modification as complicated as the C-5 RERP could be 
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accomplished utilizing the same principles contained within this study given an ample amount 
of time to do so.    
Question 3:  If the guide is deemed applicable for use in modification or upgrade 
programs what areas within the guide requires changes and what changes are 
recommended? 
The concepts presented in the draft guide are mainly focused on acquisition of an 
entirely new weapon system.  To get the best results from this document as a tool for 
modification programs some changes should be made.  One area that did not receive much 
attention was historical data examination and sensitivity analysis.  A critical insight gained 
during this research was how examination of different factors such as characteristic life values 
and the impact such evaluation has on achieving predicted measures.  More emphasis should be 
placed on reliability sensitivity analysis and availability sensitivity analysis.  The document as 
it stands now only examines a comparative evaluation of competing systems without evaluating 
the variables of each system to determine how this analysis affects feasibility and overall 
availability. 
Because the document does not address the historical performance of weapons system, 
the creators only evaluate sustainment requirements based on a constant failure time 
distribution.  This document should address time dependent failure distributions based on 
actual failure data.      
Question 4:  How should historical reliability and maintenance data information 
systems be utilized to establish availability and reliability estimates? 
The REMIS maintenance and supply data system that was utilized in this research 
provided a tool to access the historical failure and repair time information needed to establish 
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sustainment requirements.  Due to limitations with current operating time reporting, REMIS 
should be utilized with the direct assistance of subject knowledge experts such as Headquarters 
AMC, the Tanker program office, and operational KC-135 units to assist in the validation of 
any assumptions made to data collection and analysis.  Also, given that each historical data 
system present tools not share between systems, time should be allotted to cross reference each 
system for accuracy and to fill in holes that can give a better picture of the entire program to 
include logistics areas.   
Question 5:  Does the current body of literature concerning Performance Based 
Logistics support our efforts to establish sustainment performance parameters? 
Through a review of a substantial body of literature outlining the theoretical basis for 
Performance Base Logistics (PBL), we have been able to determine that PBL can be used as a 
tool to aid in the design of product support strategies for new programs or major modifications, 
or as we reengineer product support strategies for legacy weapon systems.  We have found that 
it is commonly perceived that performance based logistics is likely to improve product 
availability, reliability, maintainability and supportability at a lower cost through leveraging 
commercial best practices.  Typically the government does a poor job at optimizing 
sustainment design for individual weapons system.  The costs effective sustainment 
management principles that commercial industry is force to adhere to under PBL contracts can 
provide a “best practices” acquisition knowledge road-map.  The lessons learned from 
commercial PBL contract implementations can be utilized to reduced the Total Life Cycle 
Costs and reduce the logistics footprint requirement under traditional acquisition contracts.   
Assumptions 
In order to conduct this research some key assumptions were made: 
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1. All subsystems identified for modification in KC-135 CNS/ATM program are required 
for flight in-accordance with the Minimum Equipment Safety Listing (MESL) for MDS 
KC135 as of December 01, 2008.  A critical failure reported on any one of these system 
causing that system to be non-mission capable causes a non-mission capable status for 
the aircraft system as a whole. 
2. Failure and Repair data reported in REMIS regarding equipment status and performance 
of maintenance actions are considered accurate. 
3. Immediately upon a report of component failure repair action will commence. 
4. A reported failure results in the failed subsystem’s replacement or repair to a level of 
new condition (renewal process). 
5. The reliability measures of mean time between failures (MTBF) will be an equilibrium 
measure based on the evaluation of actual failures reported over the 12 month reporting 
period for the aircraft and units of study. 
6. The time that an aircraft is available for flight operation is based on the time from 
completion of a maintenance action to the start of the next maintenance actions based 
on a 24 period. 
7. Information received from Headquarters Air Mobility Command and industry 
pertaining to Commercial Off-the Shelf Technology (COTS) is accurate. 
8. Independence between subsystems exist. 
Limitations 
One of the main requirements in determining time between successive failures is the 
operating time of the equipment being evaluated.  One of the limitations and a known system 
abnormality in REMIS is that the system does not output current operating time in reports that 
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contain this field.  The method of using a 24 hour operating clock to determine MTBF was 
validated utilizing data obtained from Headquarters Air Mobility Command.  Current operating 
for each unit under evaluation would give a more precise measurement for each unit being 
evaluated. 
We selected only the Reliability and Maintainability Information System (REMIS) will 
be the only reliability and maintainability information system used to perform this research.  A 
more thorough evaluation of the capabilities and shortcomings of each data source could 
provide an improved level of validation of the legacy systems historical performance 
measurements. 
Future Research Opportunities 
The key objective of this research was not to achieve optimized materiel readiness 
requirements for the program under evaluation in this study, but to aid in determining if the 
draft guide proposed by OSD was applicable as a tool to in establishing mandatory readiness 
requirements.  To truly gauge the effectiveness of this guide as a tool to establish optimal 
readiness goals, costs should be evaluated in addition to the factors address in this research.  
The sensitivity analysis performed during this research along with costs data should provide 
better insight on Total Life Cycle Costs. 
Also, an analysis of a program that is much more complex in scope and number of the 
subsystems or components to be modified could provide better insight on how the processes 
outlined in this study could impact overall system availability. 
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Appendix 1 – PRP-4126 Screenshots 
 
 
Figure 10- PRP-4126 On/Off Equipment Maintenance Detail Report 
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Figure 11- On/Off Equipment Maintenance Detail Report 
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Figure 12- On/Off Equipment Maintenance Detail Report 
  
67 
 
Appendix 2 - PRP-4126 Excel Screenshots 
 
 
 
Figure 13– PRP-4126 On/Off Equipment Maintenance Detail Report (Excel) 
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Appendix 3 – Arena® Input Analyzer Failure Time Distribution Histograms 
 
 
Figure 14– DFD Failure Time Distribution 
 
 
Figure 15– AOA Failure Time Distribution 
 
 
 
Figure 16– AP Failure Time Distribution 
Weibull,  K. S. p < 0.01 
Weibull,  K. S. p < 0.1 
Weibull,  K. S. p < 0.01 
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Figure 17– RA Failure Time Distribution 
 
 
 
Figure 18– Aircraft minus Upgrades Failure Time Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Weibull,  K. S. p < 0.01 
Exponential,  K. S. p < 0.01 
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Appendix 4 – Arena® Input Analyzer Repair Time Distribution Histograms 
 
 
 
Figure 19– DFD Repair Time Distribution 
 
 
Figure 20– AOA Repair Time Distribution 
 
 
 
Figure 21– AP Repair Time Distribution 
Lognormal,  K. S. p < 0.01 
Exponential,  K. S. p > 0.15 
Beta,  K. S. p < 0.01 
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Figure 22– RA Repair Time Distribution 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23– Aircraft minus Upgrade Repair Time Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lognormal,  K. S. p < 0.01 
Beta,  K. S. p < 0.01 
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Quantification of Mandatory Sustainment Requirement 
 
 
To emphasize the importance of sustainment, the DoD Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council addressed sustained Materiel readiness and established a mandatory Key Performance 
Parameter (KPP) for Materiel Availability; it also established supporting Key System 
Attributes (KSAs) for Materiel Reliability and Ownership Cost (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3170.01C, 2007).  KPPs are those system attributes considered most 
critical or essential for an effective military capability.  KSAs are those system attributes 
considered most critical or essential for an effective military capability but not selected as a 
KPP.  KSAs provide decision makers with an additional level of capability prioritization below 
the KPP but with senior sponsor leadership control (generally 4-star level, Defense agency 
commander, or Principal Staff Assistant) (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 
(CJCSM) 3170.01C, 2007). 
The values used to describe each KPP and KSA are defined by a threshold value and an 
objective value.  The threshold value for an attribute is the minimum acceptable value 
considered achievable within the available cost, schedule, and technology at low-to-moderate 
risk. Performance below the threshold value is not operationally effective or suitable.  The 
objective value for an attribute is the desired operational goal achievable but at higher risk in 
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cost, schedule, and technology. Performance above the objective does not justify additional 
expense. 
No distinction is made between the approaches in establishing these values for major 
system acquisitions, versus smaller, modification-focused efforts for existing systems.  In some 
cases a range of stated values may be appropriate, but in other cases the best approach may be 
to specify the value as a percentage change or as a function of other variables.  The Joint Staff 
proposed guidance, “Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Cost (RAM-C) Guide,” to 
assist in determining these values for major acquisition programs, but the guidance has yet to 
be tested on modification contracts.  To assess its applicability, we performed a case study of a 
recent acquisition program under consideration by Air Mobility Command.  We sought to 
apply the principles put forth in this draft guide prepared by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) in Collaboration with the Joint Staff. 
Air Mobility Command (AMC) lacks a standardized method to establish these 
mandatory threshold and objective values for the Materiel Availability KPP and Materiel 
Reliability KSA for modifications to existing weapons systems.  In order to address this issue 
the draft guide proposed by the Joint Staff was applied to a modification effort under 
consideration by AMC. 
The Air Force Air Mobility Command’s Directorate of Plans and Programs approached 
us with a request for help in quantifying their KPPs for several ongoing major aircraft 
modifications, and will support our research.  Therefore, we initially focused our research on 
recommending a standardized method for quantifying Materiel readiness sustainment metrics 
for Air Force Air Mobility Command’s modification efforts but we designed our approach and 
methods to be applicable to all major system modifications and upgrades. 
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To achieve this objective, we used an ongoing AMC major aircraft modification as a 
case study.  We also engaged in bi-lateral discussions with program and subject matter experts, 
and conducted a review of applicable literature to develop a model that incorporates multiple 
factors impacting each sustainment metrics.  This model was based on the concepts and 
principles put forth in the RAM-C draft guide.  The decision model included components of 
predictive modeling and sensitivity analysis of the subsystem components that are incorporated 
within the projected upgrade to determine the overall affect on Materiel readiness values.  The 
sensitivity analysis performed demonstrates the ability of the procedures utilized in the study to 
provide decision makers with additional tools that provide visibility of the trade-offs that may 
be capitalized upon.  The concepts in this guide would allow developers to meet the warfighters 
requirements in a realistic manner while simultaneously minimizing costs. 
The processes utilized in this research were able to prove that the draft RAM-C guide 
developed by the Joint Staff is a valuable tool to help combat developers think through the top-
level sustainment requirements for RAM-C early in the requirements generation and refinement 
phases of a program.  With the addition of information that addresses sensitivity analysis 
required and the historical performance of the legacy weapon system included in this guide we 
feel that this document could prove to be an even better tool when applied to the modification 
of existing weapons systems. 
 
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the US 
Government. 
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